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Abstract
This paper studies the interaction between incentive labour con-
tracts, competition ` a la Cournot and industry proﬁts, in a context
where workers’ eﬀort is not veriﬁable and the probability of the un-
employed getting a job can depend on their employment histories ac-
cording to the degree of product market competition. It is shown
that eﬃciency wages paid by each ﬁrm can decrease when competi-
tion becomes ﬁercer. With discretionary bonuses, instead, wages are
generally uncorrelated with competition, but there exists an upper
threshold for the number of competing ﬁrms, over which proﬁts col-
lapse to zero. Moreover, if information about ﬁrms’ misbehaviour in
paying bonuses ﬂows in the labour market at a low rate, ﬁrms can
make positive proﬁts only by paying eﬃciency wages.
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11 Introduction
The nature of the relationship linking the number of ﬁrms competing in a
product market and the industry proﬁts (i.e. the sum of the ﬁrms’ proﬁts)
is a fundamental determinant of market structure and functioning, since it
strongly aﬀects the incentives for ﬁrms in various directions (i.e. in deci-
sions on colluding, merging, deterring entry by new ﬁrms, etc.). While in the
standard Cournot model of oligopoly with exogenous production costs, as
the number of ﬁrms in the market increases, industry proﬁts decrease sim-
ply because ﬁrms’ revenue diminishes owing to increased competition, the
relationship between the number of competing ﬁrms and the industry proﬁts
was recently investigated by relaxing the assumption that production costs
are exogenous (Naylor, 2002; Matsushima, 2006). In this regard, as is well-
known from the literature on unionized oligopolies (see the seminal works
by Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Dowrick (1989)), labour markets play a
signiﬁcant role on the nature and outcome of product market competition
due to the fact that labour represents for ﬁrms a major factor and cost of
production. Moreover, contract theory (e.g. Hart and Holmstr¨ om, 1987)
has long stressed that, when workers’ eﬀort is not contractible, designing in-
centive contracts by ﬁrms becomes a crucial aspect for obtaining production
goals and reducing labour costs.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the interaction between in-
centive labour contracts, the number of ﬁrms competing ` a la Cournot in
the product market and industry proﬁts. With regard to labour incentive
contracts, we refer to a framework in which workers’ (agents’) eﬀort is (im-
perfectly) observable by ﬁrms (principals), but is not veriﬁable by a third
party (e.g. a court). Hence, in order to provide parties with incentives
to fulﬁl informal agreements, labour contracts must be designed so that the
value of continuing the relationship in the future is suﬃciently large that nei-
ther party wishes to renege on the contract (e.g. Bull, 1987; MacLeod and
Malcomson, 1989). In particular, we consider two widely studied alternative
2incentive schemes, namely, eﬃciency wages and contracts with discretionary
bonuses (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1998;
Malcomson, 1999), and compare their implications on industry proﬁts when
ﬁrms compete in the product market and use such schemes to motivate their
workers.
In this context, we also introduce an important departure with respect
to standard assumptions. In particular, we assume that the probability of
an unemployed worker ﬁnding a job can depend on his/her past employment
history. More exactly, workers who have been previously ﬁred as the result
of low eﬀort may have a lower probability of ﬁnding a new job with respect
to other workers. Furthermore, and more importantly, we relate such a pos-
sibility to the number of ﬁrms competing in the product market. As we will
discuss, this can be motivated assuming that costs of gathering information
about workers’ previous employment histories increase with the number of
ﬁrms in the market.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. When ﬁrms use eﬃ-
ciency wages and the number of ﬁrms competing in the product market is
low, which implies that workers’ reputation matters, the wage rent paid, in
equilibrium, by each ﬁrm decreases if the probability of unemployed workers
ﬁnding a job increases. This result, which is in contrast with the Shapiro
and Stiglitz’s (1984) shirking version of eﬃciency wages (where workers’ rep-
utation can never be established), is due to the fact that an increase in the
probability of ﬁnding a job also increases the “opportunity-cost” of shirk-
ing and permits ﬁrms to elicit high eﬀort from workers even with a lower
wage. Moreover, since the “matching” probability for the unemployed in-
creases with competition in the product market (i.e. with employment), if
the number of competing ﬁrms is suﬃciently low and the (positive) eﬀect on
the wage that derives from vanishing workers’ reputation is not excessively
strong, the eﬃciency wage paid by each single ﬁrm decreases as competition
becomes ﬁercer. At the same time, however, industry’s total wage bill (i.e.
the sum of the ﬁrms’ wages) always increases (hence, industry proﬁts always
3decrease) because, with competition increasing at the margin, wage reduc-
tion for infra-marginal ﬁrms is always lower than the wage paid by marginal
ﬁrm.
When ﬁrms adopt discretionary bonuses, instead, they do not need to
provide any rent to their workers to motivate them. Thus workers’ wages
do not depend on unemployment in the labour market. As a consequence,
wages are uncorrelated with the number of ﬁrms competing in the product
market and industry proﬁts decrease with number of ﬁrms only due to the
standard competitive eﬀect. However, this holds true only if the number of
ﬁrms is no higher than a given threshold, which is related to product market
as well as labour market parameters. Indeed, since proﬁts decrease as the
number of ﬁrms increases, there exists a critical threshold for the number of
ﬁrms competing in the market, over which each single ﬁrm’s proﬁt is too low
to make its promise to pay the bonus credible. Hence workers shirk on the
job and proﬁts collapse to zero.
The above results also open up the possibility of comparative analysis
of the relation between the two incentive schemes considered and industry
proﬁts. Although eﬃciency wages imply ﬁrms pay a rent to motivate their
workers while discretionary bonuses do not, there remains a possibility for
industry proﬁts to be higher when ﬁrms adopt eﬃciency wages. This could
happen if proﬁts with eﬃciency wages are still positive when the threshold
related to the number of ﬁrms competing in the market is approached (that
is, when proﬁts collapse to zero when ﬁrms pay discretionary bonuses). In
particular, in such a case, while proﬁts are always higher with discretionary
bonuses for relatively low numbers of competing ﬁrms, there exists a range,
over and above the threshold, for which ﬁrms make higher (positive) proﬁts
by paying eﬃciency wages. We show that this applies when there is a rel-
atively low rate at which information about ﬁrms’ misbehaviour in paying
bonuses ﬂows in the labour market.
Our paper directly deals with the recent literature exploring the relation
between the number of ﬁrms competing in the market and industry proﬁts
4with endogenous production costs. In particular, the works of Naylor (2002)
and Matsushima (2006) are those closest to ours. Naylor (2002) considers a
bilateral oligopoly model, in which downstream ﬁrms’ costs (wages) are de-
termined through (Nash) bargaining with upstream agents (labour unions),
and shows that the relationship between industry proﬁts and the number of
ﬁrms in the downstream sector depends on the relative bargaining power of
the downstream and upstream agents.1 Matsushima (2006), instead, shows
that, under free entry into input markets, the relationship between indus-
try proﬁts and the number of ﬁrms competing in the (downstream) market
depends on ﬁxed costs (the ease of entry) in the input markets. Our paper
diﬀers in that, to the best of our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst to study the con-
nections between workers’ motivation concerns and incentive contracts, and
the number of ﬁrms in the (downstream) market and industry proﬁts.
Due to the emphasis we place on incentives for workers, our paper could
also be in some way related to the growing literature that investigates man-
agerial delegation (see the seminal works of Fershtman (1985), Vickers (1985),
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987)) and incentive contracts (see,
in particular, Schmidt (1997) and Raith (2003)) in oligopolistic markets.2
This literature, however, diﬀers from our work mainly because it considers
principal-agent problems, in which formal incentive contracts that link work-
ers’ (managers’) pay to ﬁrms’ performance measures (i.e. proﬁt and revenue)
are feasible, and studies changes in the optimal shape of incentive contracts
following changes in product market competition. By contrast, we consider
1Similar works are: Horn and Wolinsky (1988), who study a diﬀerentiated oligopoly
with upstream and downstream agents, but assume a duopolistic market; Dowrick (1989),
who analyzes a bilateral oligopoly and shows that the bargained wage varies with the
number of ﬁrms, but does not consider the relationship between proﬁts and the number of
ﬁrms; and Naylor (1999), who considers unionized oligopoly in the context of international
trade, but does not allow the number of ﬁrms to vary.
2See Cu˜ nat and Guadalupe (2005) for an empirical study on the eﬀect of product
market competition on the explicit compensation packages that ﬁrms oﬀer their CEOs,
executives and workers.
5the eﬀects of labour incentive contracts on industry proﬁts (via changes in
the number of ﬁrms competing in the product market) in a context in which
formal incentive contracts are not feasible, or ﬁrms are reluctant to use veri-
ﬁable signals of workers’ performance (see below). Thus parties must rely on
other contractual schemes, such as termination contracts or informal (im-
plicit) incentive contracts.
Therefore, obviously, our work is based (and largely draws) on the im-
plicit (self-enforcing) contracts literature. Most notably, in “anonymous”
(labour) markets, that is, in a context where establishing an external rep-
utation is impossible for both workers and ﬁrms, MacLeod and Malcomson
(1998) model the choice between eﬃciency wages and performance pay with
discretionary bonuses as a function of labour market conditions (i.e. pres-
ence of unemployed workers or unﬁlled vacancies). By contrast, the aim of
this paper is to compare eﬃciency wages and performance pay in relation to
product (instead of labour) market conditions and especially to study how
they aﬀect industry proﬁts diﬀerently according to the number of ﬁrms com-
peting in the product market. This requires that we consider a situation in
which eﬃciency wages and discretionary bonuses are together sustainable in
the labour market and this will lead to a framework, in which, on the one
hand, there are unemployed workers and, on the other, some sort of ﬁrms’
(and workers’) reputation must play a role.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the basic frame-
work and unemployment values and ﬂows are described. Section 3 presents
the competition game in the product market and analyzes, as a benchmark
case, a situation in which courts are faultless and omniscient agents. In this
context, where eﬀort-based labour contracts are fully enforceable, it will be
possible to isolate the “competition eﬀect” on industry proﬁts, solely due to
increasing the number of ﬁrms competing in the product market. Incentive
labour schemes are studied in Section 4, while their eﬀects on industry prof-
3The role of workers’ reputation is discussed in Malcomson (1999), but it is not related
to the degree of product market competition, as will be eﬀected in this paper.
6its operating via the number of ﬁrms competing in the product market are
analyzed, compared and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes,
while technical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Economic environment
Time is discrete, t = 1,2,...4 There is a number n ≥ 1 of identical ﬁrms com-
peting ` a la Cournot repeatedly over time in a homogeneous goods market,
with inverse demand function given by:
p = a − cQ (1)
where Q =
 n
i=1qi. There is also a pool of ℓ identical workers, with ℓ > n.
Each employment relationship consists of a repeated game played between a
ﬁrm and a pool worker who form a match in a certain period and interact until
their relationship is severed. Let us suppose that, at the end of each period,
each match becomes unproﬁtable at the rate s for exogenous reasons and
in such a case ﬁrm and employee separate. Firms and workers have inﬁnite
life, they are risk-neutral and discount the future with the same rate r. For
simplicity, we concentrate on a situation in which each ﬁrm employs one single
worker (e.g. the ﬁrm’s top manager)5 and all ﬁrms marginal costs, other
4Since in this environment the technology, the preferences and any other variable are
stationary, that is, they remain unchanged over time, we do not need to denote variables
by a time index.
5By concentrating upon the ﬁrm’s top manager, we do not exclude the possibility that
ﬁrms employ other workers to produce. However, we will only focalize on incentives for
the manager and admit that providing proper incentives for the latter also ensures that all
other workersinside ﬁrms adequately do their jobs. This is consistent with the “supervision
hierarchies” or “scale-of-operations” literature (e.g. Calvo and Wellisz, 1978), according
to which providing incentives for top executives in monitoring and control limits the scope
for opportunistic behaviour by the subordinates, and, without loss of generality, permits
to consider as constant the (marginal) cost of any other worker inside each ﬁrm.
7than the wage of the considered worker, are constant and normalized at zero.
The worker’s eﬀort (e.g. in decision, control and coordination functions)
is essential for production and, in particular, we assume that the worker
employed by ﬁrm i can choose an eﬀort level ei ∈ {el
i,eh






0 if ei = el
i
argmaxπi if ei = eh
i
(2)
where πi is the ﬁrm i’s per-period proﬁt. That is, while high eﬀort by the
worker ensures producing the level of output that maximizes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
(which will be derived below in detail), there is no ﬁrm’s production (hence,
proﬁts) when the worker “shirks” (i.e. he/she chooses ei = el
i).6 Furthermore,
in each period, the worker employed by ﬁrm i obtains an utility given by:
ui = wi − ei (3)
where wi is the wage paid by ﬁrm i, while we normalize to zero the utility
of the worker when unemployed.
According to the self-enforcing contracts literature (e.g. MacLeod and
Malcomson, 1989, 1998), and in contrast with the standard principal-agent
models (e.g. Hart and Holmstr¨ om, 1987), we assume that workers’ eﬀort is
observable, even if imperfectly. That is, in each period, ﬁrms always have
a strictly positive probability to observe the level of eﬀort chosen by their
workers. However, eﬀort is not veriﬁable by a court and other veriﬁable
measures of performance are not available or it is not in ﬁrms’ interests to
use them to motivate workers (e.g. Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom, 1991; Baker,
1992). This is in accordance with Williamson et al. (1975), who emphasize
that workers’ performance (or eﬀort) is frequently something that a court is
unable to measure.7
6The hypothesis of zero ﬁrm i’s output (and proﬁts) with ei = el
i, whilst useful to
simplify the following analysis, is not essential, from a qualitative viewpoint, for ﬁnal
results.
7In many situations, implicit contracts (also labelled as “relational contracts”), may
82.2 Unemployment values and ﬂows
In relation to labour market functioning, it is important to deﬁne ﬁrst the
general aspects connected with unemployment values and ﬂows, since we in-
troduce an important departure with respect to standard assumptions. We
admit that the probability of an unemployed worker ﬁnding a job in any
period can depend on his/her past employment history. In particular, work-
ers who have been previously ﬁred by a ﬁrm as the result of low eﬀort can
be characterized by a diﬀerent (i.e. lower) probability of ﬁnding a new job
compared with other workers. This is in contrast with the standard shirking
version of eﬃciency wage models, stemming from Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
according to which a bad reputation for shirking workers cannot be estab-
lished in the labour market. Hence unemployed values for “shirkers” and
“non-shirkers” are always the same. As emphasized by Malcomson (1999,
p. 2340), the Shapiro-Stiglitz’s “anonymous” labour market assumption is
plausible when acquiring information about workers’ previous employment
experience is costly for ﬁrms. In this paper, we hypothesize that this cost is
related to the number of ﬁrms operating in the market, that is, the larger
the number of ﬁrms, the higher the cost that ﬁrms must bear to acquire
information about workers. We believe this is consistent with MacLeod and
Malcomson’s (1998, pp. 392-3) argument that “in an anonymous market [...]
it is hard to keep track of participants, something that may well be true
of workers from poor areas of large cities”; “large markets” (i.e. markets
with a relatively high number of competing ﬁrms), similarly to large cities,
make keeping track of workers more diﬃcult and costly for ﬁrms. In par-
ticular, we assume that if the product market is extremely competitive, the
cost to discover workers’ previous employment experience is too high and the
Shapiro-Stiglitz assumption holds. By contrast, if a small number of ﬁrms
compete in the market, acquiring information is relatively cheap and workers’
outperform formal agreements. For instance, an informal contract may allow parties to
utilize their detailed knowledge and adapt to new contingencies as soon as they become
known, even when such information is not promptly veriﬁable by a court.
9reputation becomes important.8
Using Ul and Uh to indicate the expected discounted lifetime utility of an
unemployed worker who has and has not been previously ﬁred for shirking,













where k ∈ {l,h}, Ek indicates the expected discounted lifetime utility,
from a generic period of time, of an employed worker of type k, m is the
(matching) probability to ﬁnd a job, in any period, for an unemployed worker
who never shirked before and, ﬁnally, J is an index function, such that J = 1
if k = h and J = θ if k = l.
Hence, the term θ represents the possibility for ﬁrms to acquire informa-
tion about workers’ previous experience (or, alternatively, the possibility for
workers to establish a reputation in the labour market) and, as discussed
above, we assume that it depends on the number of ﬁrms in the market.
Assumption 1 The function θ = θ(n) ∈ [0,1), with θ(1) = 0 and 1−θ(n) <
ε (with ε a small positive inﬁnitesimal quantity) for any n ≥ n, with n
suﬃciently large. Furthermore, for any n, θ(n) is continuously diﬀerentiable
and non-decreasing.
According to Assumption 1, when the number of ﬁrms is suﬃciently large
(n ≥ n), hence the product market is (suﬃciently) competitive, θ ≈ 1 and the
Shapiro-Stiglitz “anonymous” market hypothesis holds. Hence, the match-
ing probability of ﬁnding a new job is the same and equal (or approximately
8Consider, for instance, the extreme case of a monopolistic market. Since a worker who
has been ﬁred for shirking could ﬁnd another job (in the same labour market) only with
the same ﬁrm, the cost the latter must bear to acquire information about the worker’s
previous experience is negligible. Moreover, also in the case of a duopoly, such a cost may
be relatively low: at most, each ﬁrm should “investigate” the worker’s previous experience,
if any, with the only other ﬁrm in the market.
9From here onwards, in order to streamline the notation, we omit the index i whenever
it is unnecessary.
10equal) to m for all workers. Instead, when the product market is a monopoly,
acquiring information about workers’ previous employment histories in the
labour market of interest is negligible. Thus a worker once ﬁred for shirking
is never employed again. Obviously, for intermediate n’s values, workers’
reputation can be established to some extent (depending on n). Hence work-
ers previously ﬁred for shirking could get new jobs with lower (but positive)
probability than other workers (i.e. 0 < θm < m).
In a stationary equilibrium, all employed workers do not shirk (i.e. ei =
eh
i ,∀i) and lose their jobs only for exogenous reasons. Furthermore, move-
ments into and out of unemployment must balance. In each period, workers
seeking a job consist of ℓ − n, who were unemployed in the previous period,
plus sn who have just lost their jobs for exogenous reasons, while sn jobs are
created to replace those that have been lost. Hence, the matching probability
for an unemployed worker is given by:
m =
sn
ℓ − (1 − s)n
. (5)
Instead, since ℓ is suﬃciently large to satisfy whatever labour demand,
and no search or matching frictions are assumed in this economic environ-
ment, in a stationary equilibrium, where all ﬁrms’ implicit promises or con-
tracts are honoured, each ﬁrm promptly ﬁnds a new worker when an employ-
ment relationship is severed for exogenous reasons.10 Also note that in this
context, it is natural to assume that ﬁrms have all market power vis-` a-vis
their workers and can ﬁx the lowest pay compatible with the workers’ high
eﬀort.
In what follows, we study a non-cooperative two-stage game. In the ﬁrst
stage, since workers’ eﬀort is not veriﬁable by courts, ﬁrms and workers must
design a labour contract ensuring that the latter do not shirk. In the second
stage, conceding that labour contracts have been designed adequately in the
ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms compete ´ a la Cournot in the product market setting their
10Assumptions about ﬁrms’ reputation are described in greater detail in Section 4.2.
11outputs to maximize proﬁts. We proceed by backward induction.
3 Stage two: the product market game
According to the economic environment described above, per-period proﬁt
for the representative ﬁrm i can be written as:
πi = pqi − wi = [a − c(qi + Q−i)]qi − wi (6)
where Q−i = qj is the sum of the quantities supplied by the other ﬁrms.11
Under the Cournot-Nash assumption, diﬀerentiation of Eq. (6) with re-
spect to qi yields the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization by ﬁrm i,






Solving all ﬁrms’ reaction functions simultaneously allows us to derive





By substituting Eq. (8) into Eq. (6), we get an expression for the ﬁrm





where w (= wi,∀i) is the outcome of the stage-one game determining the
optimal incentive labour contract. Finally, also note that, since no ﬁxed costs
are included in this economic environment, it will make sense to focus only
on situations in which ﬁrms’ (hence, industry’s) proﬁts are positive.
11Clearly, in the monopoly special case Q−i = 0.
123.1 “Fully veriﬁable” eﬀort and competition eﬀect
Before analyzing the nature and the eﬀects of incentive contracts with un-
veriﬁable eﬀort, let us brieﬂy consider, as a benchmark case, an environment
where eﬀort is veriﬁable (and perfectly observable), courts are omniscient
agents and every contract is enforced. In such a situation, a ﬁrm which aims
to elicit its worker’s eﬀort can design a labour contract in each period that
simply makes the whole payment of its worker contingent upon the provision
of eh. Clearly, the worker will provide eh as long as the wage compensates
him/her for the reservation (unemployment) utility plus the disutility for
“high” eﬀort, that is, recalling that unemployment utility is normalized to
zero, as long as w ≥ eh. Hence, a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm (with all market
power) will set w = eh and, according to Eq. (9), in equilibrium, each single


















From Eq. (11), it may be shown that increasing n, the number of ﬁrms












h < 0 (12)
with n ≥ 1. This result can be related to the standard eﬀect of increased
competition in the product market (e.g. Naylor, 2002).
4 Stage one: the labour incentive contract
Obviously, when eﬀort is not veriﬁable, parties must be able to design al-
ternative arrangements to incentivise devices based on perfectly enforceable
13variables. Shirking versions of eﬃciency wage models (also known as “ter-
mination contracts”) attain such result with contracts in which the wage is
independent of performance and workers are discouraged from shirking by
the threat that the contract will be terminated and fewer alternative em-
ployment opportunities will be available in the future. Instead, when ﬁrms
promise to pay a discretionary bonus, the situation is more problematic since,
in principle, they always have the incentive to renege on the promise if there
is no future consequence for this. In what follows, we brieﬂy analyze the func-
tioning of these incentive mechanisms and outline the most important results
thereof that apply in our framework. Instead, the incentive schemes’ eﬀects
on industry proﬁts, via interaction with the number of ﬁrms competing in
the product market, will be studied in Section 5 in greater detail.
4.1 Eﬃciency wages
As already stated, the best known model in shirking versions of eﬃciency
wages is that of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Here we consider a version of the
same model modiﬁed to take into account the assumption, described above,
about workers’ matching probability.12 Let us assume that ﬁrms monitor
their workers in each period with probability x and deﬁne with El
EW the
expected discounted lifetime utility for a worker choosing el. Assuming, for
simplicity, that per-period payoﬀs are made at the end of the period and


















  w − el + (s + x)Ul
r + s + x
(13)
12We also work with discrete time while Shapiro and Stiglitz’s (1984) model is set in
continuous time.
13Moreover, we make the standard assumption (e.g. Blanchard and Fisher, 1989, Ch.
9) that the period is short enough that we can ignore terms that are products of s and x.
14where   w denotes the (eﬃciency) wage paid by the ﬁrm. Instead, the

















  w − eh + sUh
r + s
. (14)
Hence, the worker will certainly shirk unless Eh
EW ≥ El
EW. Substituting
for Ul and Uh from Eq. (4) in Eqs. (13) and (14), respectively, rearranging
and solving for   w, we get the following incentive-compatibility condition (or
“no-shirking condition”) for the worker:











which, in equilibrium, holds with equality because proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms
pay the lowest wages consistent with it.14
Deﬁne with α the last term in brackets of the Eq. (15)’s r.h.s. As usual,
since α > 0, ﬁrms must pay a rent to their workers in order to motivate them.
Also note that, as is intuitive, α positively depends on θ: when workers’
reputation matters (lower θ’s values), ﬁrms are able to get high eﬀort by
workers even by paying them lower wage rents. Furthermore, for n ≥ n
(θ ≈ 1), α ≈
r+s+m
x and the Shapiro-Stiglitz standard results apply (i.e. the
eﬃciency wage increases with r, s and m and decreases with x). By contrast,
when n (hence, θ) is suﬃciently low, a diﬀerent result can be obtained in
relation to m.
Result 1 For a suﬃciently low n (number of ﬁrms competing in the prod-
uct market) the eﬃciency wage decreases when the matching probability m
increases.
14To be exact, the denominator of the term in squared brackets is (r+m)x+sm(1−θ).
In order to simplify the following analysis, without substantially aﬀecting the ﬁnal results,
we have omitted the second addendum because it is negligible. In particular, (while s is
always suﬃciently low; see fn 13) when m is suﬃciently high (because n is large), 1−θ is
close to zero and vice versa.
15Proof. See the Appendix.
The rationale behind the Result 1 is straightforward. If workers’ rep-
utation does not play any role, there is no diﬀerence for workers between
losing a job due to shirking or for exogenous reasons. Thus, as highlighted
by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), an increase in m makes losing a job less se-
vere for all workers, and forces ﬁrms to pay higher wages to motivate them.
By contrast, when workers’ reputation matters (i.e. n and θ are suﬃciently
low), an increase in m increases the “opportunity-cost” of shirking (because
losing a job due to shirking means that the probability of being re-employed
becomes zero, or greatly decreases, for shirkers). This permits ﬁrms to elicit
high eﬀort from workers, even with a lower wage.15
4.2 Discretionary bonuses
Let the worker’s wage w now be divided into two components: a ﬁxed salary w
(whose payment can be enforced by a court) plus a bonus element b (e.g. Bull,
1987; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989). Since eﬀort is not fully observable,
the best a ﬁrm can do is not to pay the bonus only to workers that are
caught shirking (before ﬁring them). Moreover, being an implicit agreement,
the bonus payment cannot be enforced by a court (e.g. a ﬁrm can always
argue that the worker was previously promised no bonus or that it has been
paid, even if this did not actually happen). Hence, since paying the bonus is
costly for the ﬁrm, the latter could always be tempted not to pay it even if the
worker chooses eh. This produces a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma distortion in
this context: in a single period game, since the ﬁrm cannot commit to paying
15From Eq. (15), it is trivial to check that the Shapiro-Stiglitz results, as regards r and
x, hold for any n (i.e. any θ ∈ [0,1)). The same applies for s, even if, when workers’
reputation matters, its role becomes more complex. This is because an increase in s,
in turn, produces an increase in m (see Eq. (5)), which actually reduces the eﬃciency
wage. It may be shown, however, that, in a stationary equilibrium, the latter eﬀect never
outweighs the “traditional” one. Hence the eﬃciency wage always (i.e. for any n) increases
with s (formal proof is available from the authors upon request).
16the bonus, the worker will perform no more than el, and the ﬁrm will not
produce at all. But, when the game is repeated inﬁnitely (or indeﬁnitely) a
sort of “Folk Theorem” could apply. This, however, requires that the contract
between parties be self-enforcing, i.e. it must always give both parties the
incentive to fulﬁl their respective parts of the agreement, despite the fact
that it is not enforceable by a court.
Once again, we will proceed in two steps. First, allowing that the ﬁrm
honors its promises, we ﬁnd the bonus value to obtain eh. Secondly, given the
optimal bonus, we deﬁne conditions that make the ﬁrm’s promise to pay the
bonus part of a self-enforcing contract. This latter step will lead us to clarify
the crucial role played, in this direction, by the number of ﬁrms competing
in the product market.
The incentive-compatibility constraint for the worker According to
the previous argument, when ﬁrms adopt discretionary bonuses to motivate
their workers, we can represent the expected discounted lifetime utility of a


















w + (1 − x)b − el + (s + x)Ul
r + s + x
. (16)


















w + b − eh + sUh
r + s
. (17)
Clearly, workers will shirk unless Eh
B ≥ El
B. Admitting that ﬁrms exploit
their market power to ﬁx the salary component such that workers exactly
receive their opportunity cost (i.e. w = eh − b), and solving for the bonus
(the implicit part of the incentive contract), we get the following incentive-





Firms choose the lowest bonus compatible with Eq. (18), which, in equi-
librium, holds with equality. As is well known (e.g. Malcomson, 1999), unlike
the eﬃciency wages case, ﬁrms can potentially motivate workers without pro-
viding them with a rent. On this point, also note that θ (i.e. the possibility
for workers to establish a good reputation in the labour market), hence dif-
ferences in unemployment values of shirkers and non-shirkers, do not play
any role in providing incentives for high eﬀort. This is because, in the equi-
librium with bonuses, employed workers receive exactly the same utility as
unemployed ones.
The incentive-compatibility constraint for the ﬁrm Firms, however,
must be able to credibly commit themselves to paying b in order to obtain
eh from their workers. This is not possible in a one-shot game, but standard
repeated game logic can imply that ﬁrms will compensate workers in the ap-
propriate way. Formally, together with the incentive-compatibility condition
for the worker, an incentive-compatibility condition for the ﬁrm must also be
satisﬁed in equilibrium.
As pointed out in the literature (e.g. Carmichael, 1984), in ongoing rela-
tionships, when agents learn past employment histories of partners, reputa-
tion can play a central role in ensuring that ﬁrms honor their promises, since
losing one’s employee as the result of cheating on a promised bonus could
produce worse future opportunities than when parties separate for other (ex-
ogenous) reasons. Labour unions, for instance, may contribute in this di-
rection by monitoring the employment relationships between a ﬁrm and its
workers and providing the workforce with valuable information regarding the
ﬁrm’s adherence to implicit contracts, as formally studied in Hogan (2001).
Furthermore, also ﬁrms themselves could have an interest in credibly foster-
ing the transmission of such information to the market since, by committing
themselves more strongly, they can oﬀer a broader range of incentives (e.g.
18Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Tirole, 1996; Tadelis, 1999; Levin, 2002).16
Even if there are reasons supporting the hypothesis that, in general, in-
formation on past employment behaviour ﬂows in the labour market more
widely in relation to ﬁrms than workers, it is implausible, as emphasized by
Malcomson (1999), that each time a ﬁrm loses employees because of cheating
on promised bonuses it is never able to recruit a new worker, just as an em-
ployee once ﬁred for shirking is never re-employed. Thus, in order to make
our analysis more general, we consider a situation in which information on
ﬁrms’ misbehaviour does not always ﬂow in the labour market, but it does so
only with a positive per-period probability z.17 Nevertheless, each time this
occurs, cheating behaviour by a ﬁrm is interpreted by the labour workforce
as a whole as evidence that ﬁrm does not fulﬁl informal agreements with its
workers. This means that no worker will be motivated to work hard for that
ﬁrm in the future.18
Indicating with Πnc the expected discounted proﬁt for a “non-cheating”
ﬁrm, i.e. a ﬁrm that honestly pays the bonus to its worker who expends eh,
this is given by:
16There are mechanisms other than a ﬁrm’s reputation that, upon creating a rent for
the ﬁrm in continuing employment relationship, prevent the temptation to cheat on the
promised bonus. For instance, as already mentioned in the Introduction, with a rationale
mirroring that used by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) show
that, when there is excess demand for labour and unﬁlled vacancies, ﬁrms are better oﬀ
keeping rather than losing their current employees due to cheating on the bonus since
they may not ﬁnd another straightaway. Furthermore, if there are turnover or ﬁring costs,
speciﬁc investments or matching frictions, as in Ramey and Watson (1997) and Scoppa
(2003), and if those are suﬃciently large, they may by themselves be enough to ensure the
ﬁrm’s honest behaviour.
17It could be argued that, since we have related θ (which reﬂects how workers’ reputation
ﬂows in the market) to the number of competing ﬁrms, this could also be done for z. The
latter argument, however, seems more problematic. For instance, in the monopoly case,
it could be diﬃcult (as well as in a more competitive case) for external agents to verify
whether the ﬁrm has promised to pay a bonus or if the latter was actually paid.














Instead, since the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is negative with low eﬀort by its worker,
it is always better for the ﬁrm to end an employment relationship than let it
continue with low eﬀort in the future. Thus, the expected discounted proﬁt













A cheating ﬁrm saves on the bonus in the current period (and ﬁres its
worker at the end of the period). However, if information about its cheat-
ing behaviour ﬂows in the labour market (which occurs with probability
z), it loses its reputation and no worker will be willing to expend eh for
that ﬁrm onwards. Hence, the ﬁrm cheats on the bonus payment unless
Πnc ≥ Πc. Solving for π, we obtain the following incentive-compatibility, or






In order to deﬁne the aggregate condition that makes implicit agreements
self-enforceable, we add the worker’s incentive-compatibility condition, Eq.
(18), to the ﬁrm’s no-cheating condition, Eq. (21) and, taking into account









which, by substituting for Eq. (9), i.e. the equilibrium value for the ﬁrm’s












19It follows directly from its derivation that the following equation is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for cooperative payoﬀs to be supported as subgame perfect equilibria
(e.g. MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989).
20Solving Eq. (23) for n and using some algebra, we obtain the following
condition for the number of ﬁrms competing in the product market, which
must be satisﬁed in a self-enforcing equilibrium:












   − 1. (24)
Since ﬁrms’ proﬁts are decreasing in n, Eq. (24) establishes an upper
constraint for the number of ﬁrms competing in the product market, for
which implicit contracts are sustainable as a self-enforcing equilibrium. In
particular, such an upper constraint is related to both product market and
labour market parameters. In detail, the higher a and the lower c (i.e. the
higher the scale or size of the product market), the higher the upper con-
straint ˜ n. Moreover, the lower the (extra) cost of high eﬀort eh (or eh − el)
and the higher the monitoring eﬃciency, x, and the frequency with which
information on ﬁrms’ misbehaviour ﬂows in the labour market, z, the higher
the upper constraint ˜ n.20 Finally, for the usual reasons, it also negatively
depends on the discount rate r. The following statement summarizes such
ﬁndings.
Result 2 There exists an upper threshold for the number of ﬁrms competing
in the product market, over which ﬁrms’ (hence, industry’s) proﬁts collapse
to zero when they use discretionary bonuses to motivate their workers. This
threshold is positively related to a, x and z and negatively related to c, eh (or
eh − el) and r.
20In particular, note that if z → 0 (i.e. a ﬁrm’s reputational mechanism does not work
at all), the ﬁrm would never gain by sticking to the agreement even if the relationships
were repeated over time. Hence there is no (positive) number of ﬁrms for which implicit
self-enforcing contracts can be established. The same holds true if x → 0 because, in such
a case, the bonus component would be excessively large for Eq. (22) to be satisﬁed.
215 Product market competition, wages and in-
dustry proﬁts
Using the results of the previous sections, we can now explore how competi-
tion in the product market aﬀects industry proﬁts according to the incentive
scheme ﬁrms use to motivate their workers.
By substituting the eﬃciency wage (Eq. (15) with equality) in the ﬁrm’s











Instead, with self-enforcing discretionary bonuses, wages do not depend
on the number of ﬁrms competing in the product market and are exactly





(n+1)2c − eh if n ≤ ˜ n
0 if n > ˜ n.
(26)
From Eqs. (25) and (26), we can easily derive corresponding industry


























(n+1)2c − neh if n ≤ ˜ n
0 if n > ˜ n.
(28)
Before comparing industry proﬁts with alternative incentive schemes, it
is worth emphasizing an aspect in relation to competition and wage be-
haviour. Indeed, whilst our previous analysis already indicated that, with
discretionary bonuses, the wage paid by each ﬁrm does not depend on prod-
uct market competition and it is simple to verify that ﬁrms’ (and industry’s)
wages are always greater (and always increase more rapidly) when ﬁrms elicit
22workers’ eﬀort by paying eﬃciency wages instead of discretionary bonuses,
the following statement highlights an interesting, and less obvious, ﬁnding.
Result 3 When competition increases, the eﬃciency wage paid by each sin-
gle ﬁrm decreases if (and only if):
• n is suﬃciently low, and;
• the (positive) eﬀect of vanishing workers’ reputation (i.e. increasing θ)
on the wage is relatively low.
However, the industry total wage bill (i.e. the sum of the ﬁrms’ wages)
always increases with n.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Result 3 can be explained as follows. An increase in competition increases
employment, thus leading to an increase in the matching probability m. In
turn, the latter produces two eﬀects on the eﬃciency wage, which operate
against one another. The ﬁrst is the typical Shapiro-Stiglitz eﬀect that in-
creases the wage, while the second, which is related to the role of workers’
reputation in the labour market, was described above by Result 1 and oper-
ates in the opposite direction. The relative importance of the eﬀects depends
on θ. We previously showed that, if θ (i.e. n) is suﬃciently low, the latter
outweighs the former. However, besides increasing m, an increase in n also
produces another important eﬀect, namely it increases θ. This reduces the
role played by workers’ reputation in the labour market and increases the rent
ﬁrms must pay to motivate their workers. Furthermore, even if the “nega-
tive” m’s eﬀect outweighs the “positive” m’s and θ’s eﬀects combined, only
wages paid by infra-marginal ﬁrms decrease, while the industry total wage
bill increases. This is because the total wage reduction for infra-marginal
ﬁrms is always lower than the wage paid by marginal ﬁrm.21
21The issue of wage behaviour according to changes in the number of ﬁrms competing in
the (oligopolistic) product market is also studied in Dowrick (1989). In particular, Dowrick
23Figure 1: Firm’s wage with EW Figure 2: Industry’s wages with EW
Figures 1 and 2 show, for the speciﬁc functional form θ =
(n−1)γ
nγ+β , which is
consistent with Assumption 1, and selected parameter values, diﬀerent possi-
ble ﬁrm’s (and corresponding industry’s total) wage behaviour as a function
of n, under an “optimal eﬃciency wage contract”.22
Obviously, since both with eﬃciency wages and discretionary bonuses
industry’s total wage bill increases (and total revenues decrease) with n,
industry proﬁts always decrease when competition increases. Formally, by
diﬀerentiating Eqs. (27) and (28), respectively, with respect to n (and re-
calling from the proof of Result 3 that α − n
∂α
∂n > 0; see the Appendix A.2),
it is easy to show that:
(1989, Proposition 2) shows that the eﬀect of an increase in competition on (ﬁrms’) wages
is ambiguous but, generally, wages decrease as the number of competing ﬁrms increases.
However, in Dowrick (1989) the eﬀects of competition on wages operate by aﬀecting rents
over which unions bargain, while, in our framework, they relate to changes produced in
the optimal incentive (eﬃciency) wage contract.
22Parameter values used for Figures 1 and 2 are: eh = 100;el = 0;s = r = 0.1;x =
0.3;ℓ = 50;γ = 10 and β = 1000, for red solid lines; γ = 1 and β = 0, for blue dashed
lines. Note that for γ = 1 and β = 0 the ﬁrm’s wage initially decreases in n since, in such
a case (unlike that with γ = 10 and β = 1000), workers’ reputation vanishes very slowly
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Hence, as n increases, industry proﬁts decrease more rapidly with eﬃ-
ciency wages than with discretionary bonuses.23
According to such results, one could also be tempted to deduce that indus-
try proﬁts can never be greater with eﬃciency wages than with discretionary
bonuses. Nevertheless, a further step is needed. As shown above, this is be-
cause (industry) proﬁts with discretionary bonuses collapse to zero when the
number of competing ﬁrms exceeds a critical threshold. Hence, for relatively
large numbers of ﬁrms (i.e. for n > ˜ n), there could be the possibility that
ﬁrms make greater (positive) proﬁts with eﬃciency wages.
Figure 3 clariﬁes this point in more detail: it describes industry proﬁts
behaviour, in relation to the number of ﬁrms competing in the market, with
alternative incentive schemes (blue dashed lines for eﬃciency wages and red
solid lines for discretionary bonuses) and for two alternative cases, both hy-
pothetically plausible. In Case 1, industry proﬁts with eﬃciency wages are
already negative when n approaches ˜ n, hence there is no possibility for them
to be higher than with discretionary bonuses. By contrast, in Case 2, proﬁts
with eﬃciency wages are still positive when n reaches ˜ n, hence there exists a
range, over and above the threshold ˜ n, for which ﬁrms make higher (positive)
proﬁts by paying eﬃciency wages.
23In particular, like the case with fully veriﬁable eﬀort, with discretionary bonuses no
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Figure 3: Incentive schemes, competition and industry proﬁts
Result 4 If the rate z, with which ﬁrms’ reputation ﬂows in the labour mar-
ket, is lower than a critical threshold negatively related to the value of α for
n = ˜ n, there exists a range over and above ˜ n, for which industry proﬁts are
higher with eﬃciency wages (i.e. Case 2 in Figure 3 applies). Otherwise,
there is no n for which industry proﬁts are greater with eﬃciency wages than
with discretionary bonuses (i.e. Case 1 in Figure 3 applies).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Industry proﬁts can be higher with eﬃciency wages only if they are pos-
itive when n = ˜ n. Taking into account that (
 
π)EW is (rapidly) decreas-
ing in n, this can happen only if ˜ n is suﬃciently low, which occurs also if
z is (relatively) low. Moreover, when ﬁrms pay eﬃciency wages, industry
proﬁts decrease with α (the term related to the wage rent). Hence, z should
be relatively low with respect to a given threshold, negatively related to α
computed for n = ˜ n, for industry proﬁts to be higher (or, in other words, to
be positive when n = ˜ n) when ﬁrms elicit workers’ eﬀort by paying eﬃciency
wages instead of discretionary bonuses.24
24In this regard, note that the eﬀect of some parameters (e.g. x or r) is not clear-
cut, since they generate both direct and indirect eﬀects that can act against one another.
In particular, on the one hand, they can reduce (increase) ˜ n, while, on the other, they
can increase (decrease) α, hence reducing (increasing), for any n, industry proﬁts with
26Before concluding, also note that when Case 1 in Figure 3 applies, that
is, industry proﬁts are never higher with eﬃciency wages, the critical thresh-
old with discretionary bonuses, ˜ n, represents the largest number of ﬁrms for
which industry proﬁts can be positive. As already remarked, this threshold
is related to product market (as well as labour market) parameters. In par-
ticular, the larger the size of the market, the larger the critical number of
ﬁrms for which proﬁts can be positive. Although this statement is hardly
breaking new ground, it is important to stress that with respect to the stan-
dard rationale, according to which the number of ﬁrms operating (eﬃciently)
in a market is directly related to its size simply due to the presence of “de-
mand constraints”, we derived this result in quite a new fashion (which, in
some sense, reinforces the standard rationale): when markets are thin (with
low a/c), larger numbers of competing ﬁrms make implicit labour incentive
contracts unsustainable as self-enforcing equilibria.
Instead, when Case 2 in Figure 3 applies, the threshold ˜ n represents
a critical degree of product market competition, above which ﬁrms ﬁnd it
worth modifying the incentive scheme adopted to motivate their workers.
More exactly, when n = ˜ n (and incumbent ﬁrms are making higher proﬁts by
using discretionary bonuses), a new ﬁrm can earn a positive proﬁt by entering
into the market, but only if it uses eﬃciency wages to elicit its worker’s eﬀort.
Furthermore, the entry of the new ﬁrm also forces those already present in the
market to change their incentive scheme, since discretionary bonuses become
no longer sustainable as a self-enforcing equilibrium. Hence, when n = ˜ n
and a new ﬁrm enters the market, the proﬁts of incumbent ﬁrms decrease for
two diﬀerent reasons: ﬁrst, as usual, because increasing competition reduces
their revenues; secondly, because it also increases their wages, due to the fact
that it forces them to switch from a less costly to a more costly (incentive)
eﬃciency wages. Moreover, by contributing to deﬁne ˜ n, they also indirectly aﬀect the
corresponding (equilibrium) eﬃciency wage via the workers’ matching probability (which,
as discussed above, plays an ambiguous role on the wage).
27wage contract (i.e. from bonuses to eﬃciency wages).25
6 Conclusion
In this paper, the interaction between product market competition and indus-
try proﬁts was analyzed in a framework where workers’ eﬀort is (imperfectly)
observable by ﬁrms, but is not veriﬁable by a third party (e.g. a court). More-
over, it was assumed that the probability of unemployed workers getting a
job may depend on their employment histories and, more importantly, that
such a possibility relates to the degree of market competition, because the
costs of gathering information about workers’ employment histories increase
with the number of ﬁrms in the market. In this context, the eﬀects of two
well-known incentive schemes, namely, eﬃciency wages and contracts with
discretionary bonuses, were studied and compared.
Eﬃciency wages paid by each ﬁrm can decrease when competition (hence,
employment) increases. At the same time, however, the industry total wage
bill (i.e. the sum of ﬁrms’ wages) always increases (hence, industry proﬁts
always decrease) because, on increasing competition at the margin, the total
wage reduction for infra-marginal ﬁrms is always lower than the wage paid by
the marginal one. When ﬁrms adopt discretionary bonuses, instead, wages
are uncorrelated with the number of ﬁrms in the product market, but there
exists an upper threshold for the number of competing ﬁrms, over which
proﬁts go to zero. This is because each single ﬁrm’s proﬁt is too low to make
its promise to pay the bonus credible. Moreover, although eﬃciency wages
25Notice that this ﬁnding opens up to non-trivial social welfare issues in relation to
market entry by new ﬁrms which, however, fall outside the scope of this paper and are
left for future research. Furthermore, it can also provide some important indications for
testable hypotheses by empirical research on incentive contracts. For instance, it seems
to suggest that, ceteris paribus, we would observe discretionary bonuses in industries with
relatively low numbers of ﬁrms, while eﬃciency wages should emerge, in a time series view,
when (in the same industries) competition becomes ﬁercer or, in a cross section view, in
other industries characterized (at the same time) by a higher degree of competition.
28imply ﬁrms pay a rent to motivate their workers while discretionary bonuses
do not, if the rate with which information about ﬁrms’ cheating behaviour
ﬂows in the labour market is relatively low, there exists a range for the
number of ﬁrms, over and above the critical threshold with discretionary
bonuses, for which ﬁrms can make positive proﬁts only by paying eﬃciency
wages.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Result 1
Proof. By diﬀerentiating the eﬃciency wage   w = eh +
 
eh − el 
α with
respect to m yields:
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∂m





θ(r + m)2 − (1 − θ)rs
(r + m)2x
(33)
whose sign depends on that of the r.h.s. numerator.
In particular, if n ≥ n (hence, θ ≈ 1), it is easy to verify that ∂α
∂m |n≥n≈
1
x > 0, hence (in line with Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)) ∂ b w
∂m |n≥n> 0. Instead,
if n = 1 and θ = 0, we have that ∂α
∂m |n=1= − rs
(r+m)2x < 0, hence ∂ b w
∂m |n=1< 0.
Moreover, noting from Eq. (33) that ∂α
∂m is increasing in θ and taking into
account, from Assumption 1, that θ is continuous and non-decreasing in n,
there will be a number of ﬁrms nm ∈ (1,n) such that:
∂   w
∂m
⋚ 0 ⇔ n ⋚ n
m. (34)
29A.2 Proof of Result 3
Proof. By diﬀerentiating the eﬃciency wage   w = eh +
 
eh − el 
α with
respect to n yields:
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θ′(n)m(r + s + m)(r + m)
(r + m)2x
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“reputation” eﬀect
      
increasing matching probability eﬀect
. (36)
An increase in n increases the matching probability m which, in turn,
produces two opposite eﬀects. The ﬁrst is the standard Shapiro-Stiglitz (SS)
eﬀect, according to which reducing unemployment increases the eﬃciency
wage. Clearly, the higher is θ (i.e. the weaker the role of workers’ reputation
in the labour market) the stronger is this eﬀect. Instead, the second eﬀect
(labelled in Eq. (36) as “reputation” eﬀect), which is higher as θ decreases,
reﬂects the role played by workers’ reputation on the eﬃciency wage. This is
negative because, when reputation matters, the higher is n (hence, m), the
higher the “opportunity cost” of shirking. However, an increase in n does
not only aﬀect m, but it also increases θ, which, in turn, aﬀects the wage rent
α. This eﬀect is captured by the ﬁrst term of Eq. (36) and, since it operates
to reduce the role of workers’ reputation, it clearly reinforces the standard
SS eﬀect against to the reputation eﬀect.














that, ﬁrst of all, can be negative only if ∂α
∂m < 0. As shown in Section
A.1, this can apply only if n is suﬃciently low (n < nm). Moreover, to be
∂α
∂n < 0, the following condition (with ∂α












∂n < 0 only if the (negative) eﬀect operating via increasing m
outweighs the (positive) eﬀect operating via vanishing workers’ reputation
(i.e. increasing θ).
To proof that, with eﬃciency wages, the industry total wage bill, (
 
  w),
always increases with n (even when
∂ b w










, where eh+(eh−el)α is the wage paid by the marginal
ﬁrm, while (eh−el)n∂α
∂n is the total variation of wages paid by infra-marginal
ﬁrms.














x > 0. Using Eq. (5) and deﬁning Ω ≡











which, using some algebra, becomes:
rΩ{rΩ[rΩ + s((ℓ + n(1 + s))(1 + sθn) + θn)] + s2n[θℓ(1 + sn) + sn(1 + sθn)]}
(rΩ+sn
Ω )2x
+ nΨ > 0. (41)










A.3 Proof of Result 4
Proof. Industry proﬁts can be higher when ﬁrms elicit workers’ eﬀort by
adopting eﬃciency wages instead of discretionary bonuses only if, under eﬃ-
ciency wages, they are positive for n = ˜ n, that is, for the number of competing
31ﬁrms for which proﬁts collapse to zero with discretionary bonuses. By sub-
stituting for n = ˜ n (Eq. (24)) in the industry proﬁts with eﬃciency wages
(Eq. (27)), and deﬁning with ˜ α the corresponding wage rent (per unit of
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or (taking into account that ˜ α ≡
(r+˜ θ ˜ m)(r+s+ ˜ m
(r+ ˜ m)x ):
z <
r(r + ˜ m)
(r + ˜ θ ˜ m)(r + s + ˜ m)
. (45)
Also note that Eq. (45) is always satisﬁed when z → 0. This is because
implicit contracts, in such a case, cannot be made self-enforcing. Hence
industry proﬁts can never be positive with discretionary bonuses. Instead,
Eq. (45) is never satisﬁed for z → 1, because ˜ n becomes too high for industry
proﬁts to be positive (for such a number of ﬁrms) with eﬃciency wages.
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